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1. Introduction
The association between earnings and prices in traditional equity valuation models is a function of
discount rates as well as the growth and persistence of earnings.1 We posit another determinant of the
association between earnings, or some other value-relevant statistic, and price: higher order beliefs or beliefs-
about-beliefs. Our analysis stems from Keynesobservation that investors will attempt to predict future
beliefs about a rms equity value, as opposed to predicting future cash ows, because equity price is
determined by beliefs. As a consequence, beliefs-about-beliefs  and not beliefs about cash ows may
drive rm share prices. Various theoretical analyses have demonstrated that beliefs-about-beliefs can foster
deviations of price from fundamental value, where fundamental value is the risk-adjusted present value of
expected future cash ows. In particular, higher order beliefs can lead to pricing bubbles in which share
prices rise temporarily above fundamental value.2 We extend those prior analyses by considering a setting
in which higher order beliefs about the association between earnings and price can support an equilibrium
association that di¤ers from the association predicted by a traditional equity valuation framework. We call
this phenomenon beliefs-driven price association.
To illustrate the role of higher order beliefs in determining the association between prices and value-
relevant statistics such as earnings, we employ a simple overlapping generations (OLG) model.3 Identical
investors with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions live for two periods. These investors
are savers (buyers) in the rst period of life and consumers (sellers) in the second period of life. The
investment opportunity set includes a risky asset that generates stochastic earnings each period. We assume
earnings are paid out as dividends and follow a simple, one-period, auto-regressive time series process. Within
the context of this model, the only news that arrives each period is earnings information.
To establish a benchmark, we characterize a steady-state linear equilibrium where the intercept and
coe¢ cient on earnings are the same at each point in time. This equilibrium characterization, which is
common in the literature, is consistent with a fundamental valuation in that price equals the risk adjusted
present value of future cash ows. Furthermore, the fact that the intercept and coe¢ cient are stable over
time is consistent with the stable earnings process that determines the valuation.
We depart from the literature by allowing the possibility of linear equilibria where the coe¢ cient on
earnings varies over time. To do so, we consider how current period investors price the risky asset if they
believe that investors in subsequent periods will place too much (or too little) emphasis on subsequent
1 See, for example, Kormendi and Lipe (1987).
2 See, for example, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Azariadis (1981), and Tirole (1985).
3 The OLG model originated with Samuelson (1958), which considered a model of production, consumption, saving, and
interest rates. The OLG model is very common in the literature on stock markets. For examples, see Banerjee (2011), Spiegel
(1998), Tirole (1985), and Watanabe (2008).
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periods earnings when pricing the risky asset. We nd that these beliefs cause current period investors to
rationally place a greater (lesser) emphasis on current earnings when pricing the risky asset, which implies
a beliefs-driven price association (BPA). As a consequence, rational expectations equilibrium price paths
can exhibit greater (or lower) associations between a value-relevant statistic and price than is implied by a
fundamental valuation.
Our central contribution is to establish that higher order beliefs directly determine the association between
disclosed information and price. As a consequence, BPA equilibria can arise where the price association
deviates from the association predicted by a fundamental valuation model. Our analysis of BPA pricing
paths suggests that the extent of BPA can vary over time, with periods of, say, high BPA followed by periods
of lower or no BPA. During periods of high BPA, (i) the cost of capital inferred from the relation between
price and earnings would appear to be low even though the cost of capital is high; (ii) price would appear to
be more informed by earnings news, even though that news conveys the same information about future cash
ows; (iii) growth prospects inferred from a price multiple would be high even though growth prospects are,
say, average; and (iv) price will be more volatile than a fundamental valuation framework would suggest.
Finally, if the variability associated with BPA is priced, higher expected returns are predicted for periods of
BPA than for periods in which prices reect steady-state fundamental valuations.
There is a long history of accounting literature regarding the notion that economic agents place undue,
or disproportionate, emphasis on accounting information (see, for example, Ashton, 1976; Hand, 1990; Ijiri
et al., 1966; Sloan, 1996). Much of this literature has alluded to bounds on cognitive capabilities, such
as limited attention. For example, Bloomeld (2002) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) discuss how limited
attention and the nature of disclosure can jointly cause prices to overweight some statistics and underweight
others. In a somewhat similar vein, Huddart et al. (2009) provides evidence that some investors xate on
rms whose prices have departed from a past trading range. Our analysis suggests that seemingly excessive
(or insu¢ cient) price associations with earnings or other value-relevant statistics can arise as an equilibrium
phenomenon even when investors are not cognitively constrained.
Because we consider a setting with rational deviations from a fundamental valuation, our study relates
to the literature on rational asset-pricing bubbles (for example, Tirole, 1985). More specically, in a simple
rational pricing bubble, an asset trades above its fundamental value in period t because investors at time
t believe the asset will trade above fundamental value in period t + 1. In equilibrium, the overvaluation
increases over time to guarantee a su¢ cient rate of return on the overpaymentat any point in time. BPA
di¤ers from a simple rational pricing bubble because it pertains to the price response to information about
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fundamental value as opposed to a predictable deviation from fundamental value.4
Our study also relates to the literature on sunspot equilibria.5 In sunspot equilibria, prices are determined
in part by stochastic events unrelated to economic fundamentals (so-called sunspots) because investors
believe security prices will be a function of sunspots. As a consequence, like BPA, sunspots create volatility
that is unrelated to underlying fundamental volatility.6 Unlike sunspot models, however, BPA is based on
an economic fundamental as opposed to being entirely spurious.
Finally, the seeming overemphasis of a value-relevant statistic that we characterize as an equilibrium
phenomenon relates to the observation that prices overweight public information and underweight private
information when investors have a short trading horizon (see, for example, Morris and Shin, 2002; Allen,
Morris, and Shin, 2006; Gao, 2008). The overweighting of public information occurs because the public
information directly determines the exit price anticipated by investors, which causes it to exert greater
inuence on their demands. In contrast, in our setting without private information, prices overweight
current public information because future prices overweightfuture public information.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our model and character-
ize the benchmark steady-state equilibrium. In Section 3, we identify linear equilibria characterized by BPA
and demonstrate how equilibrium pricing paths can exhibit time-varying degrees of BPA. In Section 4, we
extend the model to consider BPA in a multi-asset economy. In Section 5, we provide empirical implications
for periods of BPA pricing. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
Consider an overlapping generations model where a continuum of investors can invest in shares of an
innitely lived risky asset and can lend or borrow at a risk free rate, r > 0. At the beginning of each period,
the risky assets earnings are disclosed and paid out as a dividend, and last periods risk free principal and
interest are paid. After the dividend, principal, and interest payments, the investment market opens and
investors form new portfolios.
There is one risky asset share per-capita in each generation, which yields earnings per share "t. The
4 In a subsequent study, Fischer et al. (2014) embed our theory of BPA into a particular rational pricing-bubble framework
to explain the observation that equity price multiples are higher for rms that are on meet-or-beat streaks. More specically,
while our study introduces BPA and its implications, Fischer et al. conjecture that streaks can make a BPA pricing path focal
and that the end of a streak is associated with an abrupt reversion to a fundamental pricing path.
5 See, for example, Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983), Jackson (1994), Jackson and Peck (1991), or Peck (1988).
6 Noise trade could also be another determinant of prices and volatility. See, for example, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002)
and (2003), Allen and Gale (1994), Bhushan et al. (1997), Delong et al. (1990a) and (1990b), Spiegel (1998), and Watanabe
(2008).
3
earnings per share follows a time series process of the form
~"t+1 = "t + ~t+1, (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is a persistence parameter and ~t+1 is the earnings innovation in period t + 1. The
innovations are independent normally distributed random variables with a common mean and variance of 0
and v, respectively.
Investors live for two periods and have wealth w to invest in the rst period of life. In the nal period of
life, investors liquidate their investments and consume their wealth. Investor preferences are characterized
by a negative exponential utility function with coe¢ cient of risk aversion , where  = 0 corresponds to the
case of risk neutrality. The single risky asset in our economy can be interpreted as the market portfolio and
the variance of its cash ow as systematic risk. We analyze an economy with multiple risky assets in the
section below on spillover e¤ects.
At time t, an investor in the rst period of life chooses the quantity of shares, q, to maximize the
expectation of
Ut =
1


1  exp
h
 

q(~"t+1 + ~Pt+1) + (1 + r) (w   qPt)
i
, (2)
where Pt and ~Pt+1 are the time t and t + 1 share prices, ~combined with a time t + 1 subscript denotes
a random variable from the perspective of an investor at time t, and the absence of ~denotes either a
realization of that variable or a xed parameter.
Before analyzing the model, we discuss seven of the models assumptions. First, we assume that each
generation of investors has a two-period life, which should be interpreted as the period where the investor
is active in the market for the asset. The assumption facilitates a simple and intuitive characterization of
equilibrium but is not necessary for establishing the existence of equilibrium exhibiting BPA. For example,
the same equilibrium characterization results in a model where each generation of investors lives for any nite
number of periods and can trade in each and every period of their life. Alternatively, BPA equilibria can
arise when investors have uncertain lives in the market and each investor has a xed probability of having
to exit the market (for example, due to a liquidity shock or an alternative investment opportunity). What is
critical to the existence of equilibria exhibiting BPA is that investors are interested in predicting an assets
future price in addition to predicting the assets future cash ows (i.e., dividends).
Second, similar to the standard CAPM, we assume that all investors are homogeneous. This implies that
investors share the same utility function and have the same beliefs regarding the assets future cash ows,
which determine future prices. Relaxing this assumption does not a¤ect our results.
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Third, we assume that the innovations to earnings are normally distributed and that investor preferences
are characterized by a negative exponential utility function with a common risk aversion parameter. The
combination of normally distributed innovations coupled with a negative exponential utility function yields
price characterizations that are simple and intuitively appealing linear functions of means and variances.
These assumptions are common to the literature, and we employ them, in part, because doing so highlights
that our ndings are not attributable to some less orthodox assumptions. We do note, however, that our
results hold for any distributional assumption for the innovations in earnings if we assume risk neutral
preferences. In addition, for a simple mean/variance expected utility specication, our ndings hold with
any symmetric distribution of the earnings innovations. Finally, the assumption that all investors have the
same risk aversion parameter also facilitates a simple equilibrium characterization but is without loss of
generality. Specically, the exact same equilibrium characterizations involving BPA can be attained if we
assume that investors have di¤ering risk aversion parameters. The pricing function in such a setting reects
the average investor risk aversion parameter as opposed to a common risk aversion parameter.
Fourth, we assume that earnings/cash ows follow a simple AR(1) process, which is similar to Ohlson
(1995). The AR(1) process is helpful because it implies a highly stable earnings/cash ow process, which
serves to highlight our observation that price associations can vary over time even if valuation fundamentals
are highly stable. An implication of this, however, is that given su¢ ciently negative innovations in the
earnings process, prices become negative. While this is an unrealistic outcome, we can make the probability
of negative prices arbitrarily small ex ante by imposing a large initial value, "0, incorporating a large xed
component into the earnings process, and/or assuming a positive drift (mean) in the innovations.
Fifth, di¤erent from Ohlson (1995), we assume that earnings are completely paid out as a dividend each
period, which ignores the potential that the rm reinvests (a fraction of) earnings.7 All of our results,
however, can be generated in a model where earnings are a function of book value, a normal return on book
value, and a stochastic residual income, and where the dividend payout is not necessarily equal to earnings.
In the appendix, we show that Proposition 1 continues to hold in such a model.
Sixth, we have assumed that investors can take any position in the available risky assets and that the
risk free asset has a perfectly elastic supply. If some measure of investors do not participate in the market
for the risky asset (or the market for one of the risky assets when we consider multiple assets), that does
not a¤ect the possibility of BPA arising as an equilibrium phenomenon. Equilibrium prices will be a¤ected,
however, because risks, including those associated with BPA, will be less e¢ ciently shared across investors.
7 The assumption that all cash ow is paid out as dividends is standard in the OLG literature (see, for example, Banerjee,
2011).
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Furthermore, if we instead assume that the risk free asset asset supply is xed as opposed to having a
perfectly elastic supply, the existence of BPA can still arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.
While all of the assumptions above are not integral to the existence of BPA equilibria, a seventh assump-
tion is. Specically, we assume that the risky asset has an innite life, and we do not impose a terminal
(or transversality) condition. These assumptions imply that backward induction arguments, which could be
used to eliminate BPA equilibria, do not apply.8 While the assumption that the risky asset has an innite
life is not unreasonable if we interpret the asset as the whole market, it is less reasonable if we interpret
the risky asset as the equity of a single rm. BPA equilibria, however, can exist even if the risky asset
has a probability of being terminated each period. While all investors know that eventually the risky asset
will be terminated in such a setting, in any period in which the risky asset exists there is always a positive
probability that it will continue to exist beyond the subsequent period. That probability of continuation, in
turn, negates backward induction arguments and allows BPA to still be sustained in equilibrium.9
2.1. Linear Equilibria
An equilibrium in our model must satisfy the following three conditions: (i) each investor chooses his
demand by maximizing his expected utility conditional on his expectations; (ii) expectations are rational
and met in equilibrium; and (iii) markets clear. We initially focus on equilibria in which price can be written
as a linear function of earnings, where the constant and coe¢ cient on earnings may vary over time:
Pt = t + t"t. (3)
In any equilibrium where price is a linear function of earnings, a new investors expected utility maximizing
demand is qt =
E[~"t+1+ ~Pt+1] (1+r)Pt
V ariance[~"t+1+ ~Pt+1]
=
"t+t+1+t+1"t (1+r)Pt
v(1+t+1)
2 . Because there is one share of the risky asset
per investor, market clearing for period t requires that qt = 1 for all investors, which implies an equilibrium
price of
Pt =
"t + t+1 + t+1"t   v
 
1 + t+1
2
1 + r
. (4)
8 Alternatively, consider a model where the rm pays a terminal dividend and ceases to exist at date T with certainty. The
trading of rational investors investors at date T  1 would lead price at date T  1 to equal fundamental value (discounted future
dividends). Given that the equilibrium price for T   1 is the fundamental value, the same arbitrage activities would lead the
equilibrium price at date T   2 to equal fundamental value. This line of reasoning can be employed repeatedly to demonstrate
that the only equilibrium linear pricing function is one in which price equals fundamental value at each trading date. Such
reasoning, however, cannot be applied in a model without a certain terminal date.
9 In models with innitely lived assets, one approach for ruling out all but the steady state equilibrium is to impose a
strong transversality condition, which, in essence, forces price to converge to a steady-state price as time passes. We discuss
the implications of potential transversality conditions more in Appendix C.
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The pricing condition implies that the price at time t equals the discounted expected value of next periods
dividend, "t, plus next periods price, t+1 + t+1"t, minus a risk premium, v
 
1 + t+1
2
. The risk
premium arises because next periods dividend and price are both determined by next periods earnings,
~"t+1, which are uncertain. The equilibrium pricing condition, eqn. (4), implies that a linear equilibrium is
dened by any t and t that satisfy the following two conditions for all t:
t =
 
1 + t+1


1 + r
and (5)
t =
t+1   v
 
1 + t+1
2
1 + r
. (6)
2.2. Steady-State Equilibria
While we generally allow the intercepts and slope coe¢ cients, t and t, to vary over time, we rst estab-
lish a benchmark by characterizing a commonly studied steady-state equilibrium where they are constant.10
Specically, we restrict attention to an equilibrium of the form PSt ("t) =  + "t, where the superscript
S indicates the steady state. Substituting t =  and t =  in eqns. (5) and (6) and solving those two
equations yields Observation 1.
Observation 1. There exists a unique equilibrium of the form PSt ("t) =  + "t, where  =

1+r  and
 =   v(1+r)2
r(1+r )2 .
The steady-state pricing function is consistent with a fundamental valuation in the sense that price equals the
risk adjusted present value of future cash ows. The present value of future cash ows at date t, discounted
at the risk free rate, is given by
P1
i=1
E[~"t+1j
t]
(1+r)i
=
P1
i=1
i"t
(1+r)i
= "t, where 
t denotes the information
available at t. The coe¢ cient on earnings, , implies that the response to earnings is increasing in the
persistence of earnings, , and decreasing in the discount rate, r. The adjustment for risk is captured in
a price haircut equal to  =   v(1+r)2
r(1+r )2 , which is greater in magnitude when the variation in earnings, v,
and the degree of risk aversion, , are greater. The risk adjustment is also larger in magnitude (i.e., more
negative) when earnings are more persistent or the discount rate is lower because the uncertain earnings
innovation has a greater impact on future price when earnings are more persistent or the discount rate is
lower.
The steady-state pricing function in Observation 1 maps closely to the dividend discount model that
serves as a common framework for empirical analyses (see, for example, Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Ohlson,
1995). That framework assumes that price equals the discounted present value of future dividends, where
10 Examples of studies that focus on a steady-state equilibrium include Allen and Gale (1997), Bloomeld and Fischer (2011),
and Spiegel (1998).
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the discount rate is assumed to reect a risk free rate plus a risk premium. Given our models underlying
assumptions regarding fundamentals, the dividend discount framework would assert that price satises
PSt ("t) =
1
1 + rA   E[~"t+1j
t], (7)
where rA is the risk adjusted interest rate and E[~"t+1j
t] = "t is the expected dividend at date t + 1
conditioned upon the information available at date t. Note that the main di¤erence between our model and
the dividend discount model is that we have decomposed the impact of risk adjusted rate, rA, on price into
two elements, the risk free rate, r, and a pricing adjustment for risk,   v(1+r)2
r(1+r )2 . Thus, when investors are
risk neutral and rA equals the risk-free rate r, our steady state equilibrium pricing function above is identical
to the dividend discount framework. When investors are risk averse, the haircut for risk and the risk free
rate do not enter our pricing function through a single denominator e¤ect but endogenously reect the same
conceptual notion as a risk adjusted rate.11
3. BPA Equilibria
The steady-state linear equilibrium is simple and intuitive; it relies on the assumption that each gen-
eration believes that price equals fundamental value (i.e., the risk adjusted present value of future cash
ows). When we allow for other beliefs, however, we open up the possibility of equilibria with time-varying
associations between price and earnings. We initially consider a class of equilibria where current investors
exhibit a constant degree of beliefs driven price association (BPA) and then use the results of this analysis
to characterize a broader class of equilibria with time-varying BPA.
3.1. Constant Degree of BPA
BPA describes the phenomenon where investors in one period believe that investors in subsequent periods
will place more or less emphasis on a value-relevant statistic, earnings in our model, than the emphasis implied
by fundamental valuation. The intuition underlying how BPA is sustained is as follows. Given that earnings
exhibit some persistence, if period-t + 1 investors place more (less) emphasis on t + 1 earnings, a period-
t investors expectation of future price places more (less) emphasis on "t. This causes period-t investors
demand to place more (less) emphasis on "t, which, in turn, implies period-t price will also place more
(less) emphasis on "t. We build o¤ of this partial-equilibrium intuition to characterize equilibria where the
price association with, or emphasis on, earnings grows or declines each generation. In other words, each
11 More generally, dynamic models with risk averse investors do not yield equilibrium pricing functions in which price is a
simple discounted sum of expected future cash ows. See, for example, Lucas (1978) or Spiegel (1998).
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generations emphasis on earnings becomes a rational response to the expected emphasis on earnings of
subsequent generations.
To formally demonstrate BPA as an equilibrium phenomenon, we characterize a set of equilibrium pricing
functions characterized by an exogenous parameter .
Lemma 1. For any  2 <, there exists an equilibrium pricing function
Pt = P
S
t ("t) + 

t"t + t, (8)
with the following coe¢ cient and intercept for all t  0:
t =

1 + r

t
 and (9)
t = v (2Jt +Kt) , (10)
where PSt ("t) =  + "t,  =

1+r  , and  =   v(1+r)
2
r(1+r )2 are the price, coe¢ cient, and intercept in the
steady-state equilibrium and where Jt = 1 
t
1 
 
1+r

t+1 
1+r  and Kt =
(1+r)t 2t
1+r 2
(1+r)t+1
2t
.
The value for , which we call the degree of BPA, determines the deviation price from the steady-state price,
where the steady-state price corresponds to  = 0. In an equilibrium with a constant positive (negative)
degree of BPA,  > 0 ( < 0), investors place increasingly more (less) emphasis on earnings because the price
response to earnings, t, increases (decreases) over time. Finally, note that a time-varying intercept term,
t, could also include a term corresponding to a rational bubble as characterized, for example, in Tirole
(1985). Since the focus of this paper is on belief-driven price association, we suppress a rational bubble term
for much of our analysis.
To understand the nature of the equilibrium pricing functions characterized in Lemma 1, it is useful
to decompose and highlight the critical attributes of those functions. The price function consists of three
components. The rst component in eqn. (8) is the steady-state price, PSt . The second component,
t =
 
1+r

t
, reects BPA, which is an increased reaction to earnings. Finally, the third component,
t = v (2Jt +Kt), is a BPA related risk premium.
Steady-state price: As discussed previously, the steady-state price, PSt = +"t, equals the risk adjusted
present value of expected future cash ows. Specically, "t = 1+r "t equals expected future cash ows
discounted at the risk free rate, and  =   v(1+r)2
r(1+r )2 reects the risk adjustment attributed to the cash-
ow risk. In addition to the determinants of fundamental value, Lemma 1 suggests that prices can also be
determined by two other components that relate to BPA.
BPA: To isolate and highlight the direct e¤ect of BPA, which is captured in the second component of price,
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t =
 
1+r

t
, consider a setting in which there is no risk aversion,  = 0. In this case,  = t = 0, and the
pricing function collapses to
Pt = "t + 

t"t = P
S
t +

1 + r

t
"t. (11)
Without risk aversion, the steady-state pricing function does not contain a haircut for risk,  = 0. A constant
degree of BPA,  6= 0, however, causes the total coe¢ cient on earnings, t =  + t =  +
 
1+r

t
, to
deviate from the steady-state coe¢ cient, , by a BPA-related term, t . Hence, the coe¢ cient on earnings is
not only determined in the usual manner by fundamentals via the steady-state term,  = 1+r  , but is also
determined by investor beliefs about the trajectory of the coe¢ cient itself via the BPA term, t =
 
1+r

t
.
Furthermore, note that, in an equilibrium with a positive degree of BPA,  > 0, investors place increasingly
greater emphasis on earnings because the price response to earnings, t, increases over time. The increasing
emphasis is necessary to sustain the BPA equilibrium. For example, suppose that the overemphasis in period
t + 1 is given by  > 0 (i.e., t+1 =  + ). A period-t investor who impounds the t + 1 price movement
in his period-t demand expects that a fraction  of the period-t earnings surprise to persist. Therefore, in
period t, the discounted value of the asset that pertains to the projected overemphasis is given by 1+r "t.
Similarly, with a constant negative degree of BPA,  < 0, the emphasis on earnings decreases every period
and eventually becomes negative (i.e., for any  < 0,  +
 
1+r

t
 is decreasing in t and is negative for
su¢ ciently high t).
A particular example of a pricing series for a case with no risk aversion and positive BPA is highlighted
in Figure 1 and juxtaposed against the steady-state or fundamental-value pricing function. The BPA pricing
path bounces around the steady-state path, and, consistent with the increase in t over time, the movements
get larger as time passes. Finally, note that a small initial degree of BPA, , leads to large swings in price
within a relatively short number of periods. Hence a little BPA can eventually generate substantial volatility.
BPA drift: Having highlighted the primary e¤ect of BPA, we turn next to a secondary e¤ect, which we call
BPA drift. BPA drift arises because BPA leads to greater price uncertainty, which alters the equilibrium
discount for risk. Specically, BPA alters the price responsiveness to uncertain earnings innovations, which
alters the variation in prices. When BPA-related increases (decreases) in price uncertainty are priced, which
occurs when investors are strictly risk averse, BPA also leads to an upward (downward) drift in prices, which
appropriately compensates investors for the increase (decreased) risk assumed. More formally, when we allow
for strictly positive risk aversion,  > 0, the pricing function is
Pt = P
S
t ("t) +

1 + r

t
"t + v (2Jt +Kt) ; (12)
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where Jt and Kt are functions that are both increasing in t. When investors are risk averse, the pricing
function again includes the traditional discount for risk,  =   v(1+r)2
r(1+r )2 , which is embedded into the steady-
state price, PSt . With BPA present, that discount is o¤set with the term v (2Jt +Kt), reecting BPA
drift.
With a positive degree of BPA,  > 0, the drift term is strictly positive and increasing for all t. To
understand the intuition underlying the increasingly positive drift term, note that, in equilibrium, risk
averse investors are compensated for any variation in payo¤s with a higher expected return (i.e., a risk
premium). Since BPA increases the variance of an investors payo¤s, the equilibrium price path has to
provide an additional premium to investors. This additional premium is provided by the positive upward
drift in prices attributable to BPA. The provision of the risk premium due to BPA via an upward drift in
price stands in contrast to the provision of the risk premium due to fundamental volatility via the discount
in steady-state price. While the mechanism providing the risk premium di¤ers, the intuition underlying the
mechanism is the same. Furthermore, note that the upward drift is increasing at an increasing rate over
time (i.e., 2Jt + Kt is increasing and convex in t), which implies that the BPA-related risk premium is
increasing over time. The reason is directly attributable to the fact that the price response to earnings is
increasing at an increasing rate over time (i.e., t =
 
1+r

t
 is increasing and convex in t), which implies
that the variance of prices is increasing at an increasing rate over time. Consequently, the risk premium to
compensate investors for BPA risk must be increasing at an increasing rate over time.
With a negative degree of BPA,  < 0, the BPA drift term is negative at rst and then, like the case
of positive BPA, becomes positive and increasing at an increasing rate. The intuition for the change in
direction of the drift is attributable to the observation that, when  < 0, the price response to earnings is
initially positive and lower than the steady-state price, which reduces the variation in prices and thus the risk
that investors bear. As a consequence, the BPA drift term is negative. The response to earnings eventually
becomes negative and increasingly so, which results in greater variation in prices than in the steady state.
As a consequence, investors eventually bear more risk, which leads to a positive BPA drift term. Hence,
regardless of whether BPA drift is positive or negative, in the long run, prices have a positive drift for any
 6= 0.
An example of a pricing series for a case with risk aversion and positive BPA is also highlighted in Figure 1
and juxtaposed against the steady-state or fundamental-value pricing function. As in the case where investors
are risk neutral, the BPA pricing function exhibits more bounce than the steady-state pricing function when
investors are risk averse. Unlike the case of risk neutrality, however, the BPA price drifts above the steady-
state pricing function due to the price drift required to compensate investors for the additional risk they
must assume. Finally, note that both pricing functions initially lie below the pricing functions with risk
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neutrality because of the haircut for risk. While the fundamental value pricing function with risk averse
investors continues to lie below the risk neutral fundamental value pricing function due to the haircut for
risk, the BPA pricing function eventually exceeds the risk neutral pricing functions due to the BPA-related
drift.
3.2. Time-Varying Price Association
The existence of linear equilibria with a constant degree of BPA introduces the theoretical plausibility
of the BPA phenomenon in a manner that highlights the intuition underlying BPA and its consequences.
The price paths exhibiting a constant degree of BPA, however, have some intuitively unappealing properties,
namely that the earnings to price association and the associated price volatility explode over time and that,
when the constant degree of BPA is negative, the earnings to price association ultimately becomes negative
and increasingly so. In this section, we broaden the set of equilibria to consider pricing paths that exhibit
time varying degrees of BPA, which permits us to consider pricing paths that do not have the unappealing
properties exhibited by the paths exhibiting a constant degree of BPA. For example, a pricing path could
initially exhibit a negative degree of BPA ( < 0), then revert to a steady-state earnings price association
( = 0), then exhibit a positive degree of BPA ( > 0), and then revert again to the steady-state association.
The idea behind time varying associations is that, when two hypothetical price paths with a constant
degree of BPA have the same price at time t =  , then it is feasible for the equilibrium price path to switch
from one degree of BPA to the other. To facilitate switching between two specic constant degree of BPA
paths, it is helpful to allow the intercept term t to contain a parameter  6= 0 such that t = t =
(1 + r)
t
 + v (2Jt +Kt).12 The -related part of the price drift is completely deterministic and follows
the intuition for rational bubbles in prior work: investors are willing to pay a higher price if they expect next
periods investors to pay an even higher price.13
To illustrate that there exist equilibria in which the degree of BPA varies over time, conjecture an
equilibrium with a single switch in the degree of BPA:
Pt =
8><>: P ("t; 1;1)P ("t; 2;2(" ))
for all t < 
for all t   ,
(13)
12 Note that, if investors are risk averse, allowing  6= 0 is not necessary for us to establish that there can be time-varying
price association. In addition, note that, if  < 0, the e¤ect of  causes price to drift downward. When investors are risk
averse and exhibit BPA, the upward price drift we discussed previously still occurs in the long run because the BPA drift grows
faster over time than the rst moment e¤ect of  < 0.
13 See, for example, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Azariadis (1981), and Tirole (1985).
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where P ("t; i;i) = PSt ("t) + 
i
t + 
i
t "t, and 2(" ) satises
P (" ; 2;2(" )) = P (" ; 1;1) (14)
for all realizations " .14 The conjectured equilibrium exhibits a switch at time  from one BPA pricing
function characterized by a degree of sensitivity 1, P ("t; 1;1), to another BPA pricing function charac-
terized by degree of sensitivity 2, P ("t; 2;2(" )). However, the complete parameterization of the pricing
function at time  is not known until " is realized because the initial value of the constant term, 2(" ),
is a function of " . Nonetheless, 2 (" ) is well dened and, for any earnings realization " , there is a
pricing function that exhibits the degree of BPA 2 yielding the same price as P ("t; 1;1) at t =  , i.e.,
P (" ; 2;2(" )) = P (" ; 1;1). Because of this feature, the pricing function at time  that is anticipated
by young investors at time    1 is still a simple linear function of the realization of earnings at time 
(i.e., P (" ; 1;1)). To summarize, the change in the degree of BPA from 1 to 2 is facilitated by chang-
ing the value of the constant term associated with the new constant BPA pricing function being tracked,
P (" ; 2;2(" )). The value of constant term is contingent on the realization " to guarantee that the price
under the initial constant BPA pricing function, P ("t; 1;1), and the new constant BPA pricing function,
P ("t; 2;2(" )), yield the same price at t =  .
While the price function in the example is linear between any time t   1 and t, the slope on the time
t earnings changes. We therefore term pricing functions that can exhibit a change in  piecewise-linear
equilibria.Specically, conditional upon some history of earnings realizations, any piecewise-linear pricing
function must only track a constant BPA pricing function from period t to t + 1. As a consequence, the
pricing function at any time can be characterized by a degree of BPA, , as well as an associated . The
constant BPA pricing function that is tracked for a period of time, however, does not have to be the same
for all periods, which opens up the possibility that the degree of BPA can vary over time.
The observation that the degree of BPA can vary over time implies that it is possible for a price path to
exhibit negative BPA,  < 0, for a period of time without ever exhibiting a somewhat implausible negative
association between price and earnings. That is, nite episodes of negative BPA can be sustained even under
the equilibrium renement that the association between price and earnings can never be negative.
Proposition 1 follows naturally from the denition of piecewise-linear equilibria and the fact that we have
characterized an equilibrium exhibiting one degree of BPA initially followed by another degree of BPA.
Proposition 1. There exists a piecewise-linear equilibrium in which the extent of BPA and the associated
14 This implies that 2 (" ) = 1 +
v
(1+r)
(1 (2J +K 1)  2 (2J +K 2)) + 1 (1   2)" .
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price response to earnings and price variability change over time.
Proposition 1 has the important implication that equilibrium price paths exist where the degree of BPA
varies over time, which implies that, say, the price response to earnings need not necessarily monotonically
increase (or decrease) if investors exhibit BPA for a nite period. Furthermore, we can use the same logic
employed to derive the equilibrium price path with a single switch in the degree of BPA to construct paths
with any number n 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g of changes in the degree of BPA. As a consequence, there exist equilibria
in which episodes of BPA may be followed by steady-state responses to earnings.
4. Multi-Asset Economies
To this point, we have employed a single risky-asset framework to illustrate BPA. A common interpreta-
tion of the single risky-asset case is that it represents the market portfolio, and, in this case, BPA pertains
to economy-wide (or aggregate) earnings disclosures, as opposed to, say, a single rms disclosure. While the
single risky-asset framework provides a parsimonious illustration of the main points of this study, a drawback
is that it does not provide insights into how BPA a¤ects prices of individual risky assets as opposed to the
market. Here we attempt to provide additional insights by extending the model to include two risky assets,
which is su¢ cient to provide the relevant BPA related insights for markets involving n risky assets.
Like our single risky-asset framework, investors are homogeneous, which means they are endowed with the
same preferences and information and that they can form portfolios involving all assets. As a consequence, in
equilibrium investors will take the same position in all assets, those that exhibit BPA and those that do not.
Crucial here is that they correctly anticipate which assets have price paths exhibiting BPA and which do
not, that is, investors have rational expectations about the equilibrium price paths. Our insights regarding
BPA continue to hold if investors have heterogeneous preferences or beliefs about the assetscash ows, or
if some or all investors are constrained to invest in a subset of the available assets.
Formally, consider our economy with two risky assets, 1 and 2, as opposed to one. Similar to the single
risky-asset setting, the earnings for asset i 2 f1; 2g for period t are
"it = i"it 1 + it. (15)
We assume the innovation to earnings, it, is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance vi for all
i 2 f1; 2g and t, the covariance between 1t and 2t is c for all t, and it is independent of j for all
i; j 2 f1; 2g and t 6=  . As the following analysis shows, the covariance of cash ow innovations, c, is an
important determinant of the BPA price e¤ect. Finally, we assume that there are  shares of asset 1 per
capita and 1   shares of asset 2 per capita such that, in aggregate, the total number of risky asset shares
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per-capita is 1. This extension of the model reects at least two scenarios: one where each asset can be
thought of as reecting a large component of the market portfolio and one where one asset is an innitely
small component of a large market and the other is the remainder of the market portfolio. The former
setting, which is captured by  assuming a strictly interior value, characterizes the relation between two
industries. The latter setting, which is captured by  approaching 0 or 1, characterizes the relation between
a single risky asset as an arbitrarily small component of a large market portfolio and the market portfolio
itself.
We again restrict attention to the set of linear equilibria where the end-of-period price for the asset i is
a linear function of its earnings:
Pit = it + it"it. (16)
We rule out equilibria where asset is price is a function of js earnings, which would essentially be a
sunspot equilibrium for rm i. In particular, in the presence of asset is earnings, asset js earnings have
no incremental information content for is future cash ows. Market clearing requires that q1t =  and
q2t = 1  , which implies that following conditions have to hold in equilibrium:
it =
i
 
1 + it+1

1 + r
for i 2 f1; 2g , (17)
1t =
1t+1
1 + r
  v1
 
1 + 1t+1
2
+ c (1  )  1 + 1t+1  1 + 2t+1
1 + r
, and (18)
2t =
2t+1
1 + r
  v2 (1  )
 
1 + 2t+1
2
+ c
 
1 + 1t+1
  
1 + 2t+1

1 + r
. (19)
Eqn. (17) is identical in structure to eqn. (5), the equilibrium condition for t in the single risky-asset setting.
This implies that we can apply results about BPA-coe¢ cient behavior derived in the single-asset setting to
either assets pricing function in the dual-asset setting. Furthermore, the fact that the two coe¢ cients on
earnings do not interact with one another implies that each risky asset coe¢ cient can exhibit di¤ering degrees
of BPA. Therefore, in the absence of additional equilibrium renements that rule out pricing paths where the
two assets exhibit di¤ering degrees of BPA, the price path of asset 1 can exhibit positive BPA, while asset 2 is
priced without (or with negative) BPA. This logic extends to an economy with N assets.15 Finally, with any
set of coe¢ cients for earnings, we can characterize the intercepts, eqns. (18) and (19), in the same manner
as in the single risky-asset setting, with the caveat that two, as opposed to one, abnormal-earnings-asset
15 Our analysis leaves open the theoretical possibility that, within the context of a large market such as the US stock market,
a fundamental valuation framework holds for all assets except for one. A more plausible conjecture, perhaps, is that BPA price
paths arise simultaneously for subset of assets, such as a particular industry, which are followed by a common set of active
investors and subject to similar economic shocks.
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coe¢ cients determine the value each period. Hence we can derive dual-asset variations of Observation 1,
Lemma 1, and Proposition 1.
Given these dual-asset variations, we discuss the spillover e¤ects of a change in the degree of BPA in the
pricing behavior of one asset to the pricing behavior of the other asset. Due to the fact that the coe¢ cients
on earnings do not interact, an increase in the degree of BPA for one asset, say asset 1, increases asset 1s
price response to its earnings, 1t, but has no e¤ect on asset 2s price response to asset 2s earnings, 2t,
regardless of the degree of covariation in the innovations to earnings. Hence changes in the price volatility
for asset 1 that are not due to changes in the volatility of fundamentals need not be associated with changes
in the price volatility for asset 2.
Inspection of eqns. (18) and (19), however, reveals a relation between the price level of asset 2 and the
degree of BPA for asset 1. In particular, increasing the degree of BPA for asset 1 inuences the price level of
asset 2 through the intercept in the pricing function, 2t. The e¤ect on the intercept depends critically on
the covariance of the earnings/dividend ows. In particular, for any linear equilibrium and any two degrees
of BPA, 1 and 2, the equilibrium 2t satises:
2t = 2 + v2 (1  ) 2 (2Jt +Kt2)
+c
 
(1 + r)
t+1  
1  t
(1 + r   )t (1  ) (1 + 2) + (1 + r)
t+1 (1 + r)
t   2t 
1 + r   22t 12
!
, (20)
where 2 =  

1+r
1+r 
2
v2(1 )+c
r is the steady-state intercept.
If the covariance between the earnings/dividends of the two risky assets is negative and we limit attention
to the cases where BPA is nonnegative, increases in the degree of BPA for asset 1 cause the expected price
level for asset 2 to be lower each period than would otherwise be the case. The reasoning behind this price-
level e¤ect stems directly from the fact that asset 2 serves as a hedge of asset 1 due to the assumed negative
covariance between the two earnings ows. In particular, as asset 1 becomes more sensitive to its earnings
due to a higher degree of BPA, the variance of asset 1s payo¤s increases. Because the covariance between
the two earnings is negative, investments in asset 2 serve as an increasingly important hedge against the
increasingly volatile asset 1, which causes asset 2s price levels and associated expected price changes to
decline. If, on the other hand, the covariance between the earnings of the two risky assets is positive, the
opposite e¤ect of asset 1s BPA arises: the expected price level increases over time to compensate investors
for the greater degree of undiversiable risk caused by asset 1s BPA.
Similarly, when BPA for asset 1 is negative and the covariance is positive, the expected price level for
asset 2 decreases. While a positive covariance implies that holding both assets increases the risks borne by
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an investor, negative BPA decreases the amount of risk. Eventually, for a negative total price association,
asset 2 becomes a hedge of asset 1, and investors can reduce their total risk by holding both assets.
Implicit in the discussion above is the notion that both assets represent a large component of the market
(e.g., each asset represents a large sector of the economy). Our next goal is to extend the discussion of
two assets to a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) perspective along the lines of Lambert, Leuz, and
Verrecchia (2007). Specically, consider the case where asset 1 represents the equity market portfolio and
asset 2 represents a single equity security in a large economy with many risky assets; that is,  ! 1.
Consistent with the CAPM, the variance of asset 2 has no e¤ect on its price. Instead, asset 2s price is
determined by how its earnings covary with market earnings, asset 1. In other words, idiosyncratic risk
remains unpriced even in periods of BPA. This can be seen by substituting  = 1 into eqn. (20):
2t ( = 1) =  

1 + r
1 + r   
2
c
r
+c
 
(1 + r)
t+1  
1  t
(1 + r   )t (1  ) (1 + 2) + (1 + r)
t+1 (1 + r)
t   2t 
1 + r   22t 12
!
. (21)
This shows that v2 has no impact on 2t when asset 2 in a single security in a large economy, i.e.,  = 1.
Hence, consistent with our prior discussion, the e¤ect of BPA on the price of asset 2 (an individual rm)
operates through the covariance of its earnings with asset 1 (the market portfolio). This implies that BPA
with respect to asset 1 increases asset 2s cost of capital by imposing more systematic risk on asset 2.
Alternatively, BPA with respect to an individual rm (asset 2) has no e¤ect on the market portfolio (asset
1) because asset 2 is an arbitrarily small element of a large economy. Note, however, that BPA with respect
to asset 2 has an e¤ect on its own price level (2t) because the increased sensitivity to its earnings increases
the exposure of the assets price to systematic risk.
Observation 2 summarizes the main insights generated by considering two risky assets.
Observation 2. Allow for the possibility of two risky assets and restrict attention to piecewise-linear pricing
functions. One assets degree of BPA at time t has no direct e¤ect on the price association or price volatility
of the other asset at time t. One assets degree of BPA at time t, however, a¤ects the price level and expected
change in price of the other asset if and only if the asset that exhibits BPA is large and the assetsearnings
have a nonzero covariance.
Observation 2 implies that the price association of earnings in one asset can be driven by beliefs without an
e¤ect on the price association and price levels of other assets. While our model more closely resembles single
assets, this result extends to industries. For example, it may be that investors rationally expect BPA in
one individual industry and thus react more (or less) strongly to all news relevant to this industry. Investors
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would, however, respond to news about the rest of the economy as implied by a fundamental valuation
framework. The reason is that, fundamentally, BPA is driven by investorsbeliefs about future prices. We
only require these beliefs to be rational but impose no further constraints. Assume (somewhat outside the
model) that investors specialize in subsets of assets instead of perfectly diversifying their portfolio. In such
a setting, it could be that one type of investor causes a BPA path in a subset of assets. Note, however,
that even investors that do not cause the BPA path will optimally react to news according to the BPA
equilibrium.
5. A brief discussion of BPA and arbitrage
As discussed above, backward induction cannot be employed to rule out equilibria exhibiting BPA.
That is, whenever a fraction of investors is interested in the next periods price (as opposed to terminal
value), then backward induction fails to eliminate a BPA price path. However, would rational investors
not naturally gravitate towards an equilibrium in which price reects fundamental value? Here we discuss
whether arbitrageurs would eliminate BPA price paths in the single and multi-asset economies.
Within the context of our model with atomistic investors who do not coordinate their trades, no rational
investor would choose to sell if price were above fundamental value and buy if price were below fundamental
value if all other investors were expected to behave in a manner consistent with a BPA equilibrium. Doing
so would only generate expected trading losses because the expected price next period would not equal
fundamental value. Instead, rational investors make an optimal investment decision given the correct beliefs
that price will exhibit BPA next period. This behavior, in turn, allows BPA to be sustained as an equilibrium
phenomenon. In other words, when an investor believes that the future price association of earnings is twice
as high as it currently is, then this investor has an incentive to attach a higher multiple to the current
earnings. This strategy maximizes the investors expected utility and no investor can increase their expected
utility by doing otherwise.
If we step outside of the model and allow some subset of investors, say sophisticated investors, to take
a coordinated action to alter a given equilibrium price path, it is far from clear that these investors would
choose terminate a BPA price path as opposed to riding it. In particular, the expected utility of investors
entering at date t increases in the future stock price volatility. This implies that these investors prefer not to
end a price path with positive BPA at date t but instead prefer to increase the price association of earnings.16
The realized utility of investors exiting at date t, however, increases in the extent of BPA only when the
16 That is, Et [Ut ("t+1)] / v2

1 +  +
 
1+r

t+1

2
+ (1 + r)w, which implies that the expected utility is increasing in the
variance of price. This occurs because, in equilibrium, investors are compensated with higher expected payo¤s if they take on
more risk.
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date t news is positive. Hence informed sophisticated investors who want to unwind their trading position
might try to terminate a positive (or to induce a negative) BPA path if date t earnings is negative and do
the converse if date t earnings is positive.
The multi-asset economy also allows us to discuss how a BPA pricing path is sustained when seemingly
perfect arbitrage opportunities exist. Specically, consider an extreme example where asset 1 is arbitrarily
small,  ! 0, and redundant in the sense that its underlying cash ows covary perfectly with those of asset 2,
c = v. In this setting, it might seem impossible for asset 1 to exhibit BPA if asset 2 is priced at fundamental
value because a perfect cash ow arbitrage exists. For example, if asset 1 trades above fundamental value,
then asset 1s exact future underlying cash ows can be acquired at a lower cost by buying asset 2. Hence it
would seem that all rational traders should sell asset 1, which would drive asset 1s price towards fundamental
value. Within the context of the model where the asset is innitely lived and investors live for two periods,
this logic falls short because, in any given period, investors are only interested in the assets underlying cash
ows in the next period plus the assets price next period. They do not concern themselves with the assets
underlying cash ows after the next period. Hence, as long as investors believe the asset will follow the
pricing path exhibiting BPA, the BPA pricing path can be sustained as an equilibrium pricing path.
6. Empirical Implications
The analysis to this point has been focused on our main contribution: to establish that the price associ-
ation of earnings can be driven by beliefs in a setting with rational investors. In establishing the theoretical
plausibility of BPA, however, we have identied a plethora of equilibria. Unfortunately, models with multiple
equilibria cannot o¤er simple empirical predictions based upon standard comparative statics analysis because
it is not clear which equilibrium should be perturbed. As a consequence, in Appendix B, we undertake an
analysis of three common forms of equilibrium renements in an attempt to eliminate all but one equilibrium.
Because we never assume that the asset is liquidated at a known terminal date and we never impose a strong
transversality or terminal assumption, however, the renements fail to narrow our attention to a single focal
equilibrium.
In spite of the fact that our analysis does not rule out multiple equilibria, the insights o¤ered by it
can still be empirically relevant because multiple equilibria may actually reect an important element of
economic reality. An equilibrium is dened by a set of endogenous outcomes that fall from some intuitively
appealing criteria, which in our case can be loosely stated as: individuals (1) act in their best interest, (2)
anticipate the behavior of others, and (3) process information well. In essence, we constrain ourselves to
focus on outcomes that make sense. It might very well be the case that actual economic agents employ similar
19
reasoning to guide their own actions and, as a consequence, those actions will lead to one of those outcomes
that makes sense. In settings where more than one outcome satises the equilibrium criteria, however, it
is plausible that individuals will not ultimately play just one of those sensible outcomes with probability
1. Instead, individuals may interact with each other repeatedly before their interactions naturally converge
to one of the equilibrium outcomes. Hence, while the equilibrium criteria do not predict exactly where an
economy settles, they restrict the set of possible outcomes. An economy might then settle on an outcome
in the restricted set seemingly at random. If this is true, then restricting attention to modeling frameworks
that force a single equilibrium misses an element of economic reality.
The empirical insights o¤ered by our model with multiple equilibria take one of two forms, which we refer
to as cautionary empirical implications and predictive empirical implications. Cautionary empirical impli-
cations are not directly testable implications but provide a reason to exercise caution when employing some
common measurement constructs employed in the empirical literature. On the other hand, our predictive
empirical implications are testable predictions.
6.1. Cautionary Empirical Implications
If the BPA phenomenon that we develop in this paper is present in markets, it could have signicant
implications for empirical measurement constructs that rely upon market prices. Consider rst a common
approach for inferring discount rates, cost of capital, or expected returns (henceforth, the market risk
premium), which relies on the assumption that price equals fundamental value (i.e., expected future cash
ows discounted at the risk adjusted rate). Under this assumption, the market risk premium can be inferred
from price level coupled with expectations of future earnings/cash ows and the risk free rate.17 The
possibility of BPA drift, however, calls such an inference into question. For example, assume an equilibrium
pricing function with  > 0 and  > 0. The expected price level and expected return on this price path
are higher than in the steady state equilibrium because of BPA drift. Applying a fundamental valuation
framework in an empirical study would suggest that the discount rate is lower in the BPA equilibrium than
in the steady-state equilibrium. In other words, agents within the model know the cost of capital is high,
whereas a researcher would incorrectly conclude the cost of capital is low.
As another example, consider a common approach for inferring the information content of earnings or
other disclosed statistics, which is to compute the association between the market price and a statistic, or the
market price response to the disclosure of the statistic, and then to assume that the information content of the
17 Empirical papes that rely on such inferred discount rates/cost of capital/expected return include, for example, Botosan
and Plumlee (2005), Sadka (2007), and Vuolteenaho (2000).
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statistic is greater when the magnitude of the association or response is greater.18 Holthausen and Verrecchia
(1988) provide a theoretical framework that supports this working assumption. If BPA is present, however,
the association and response are determined by higher order beliefs in addition to Bayesian expectations of
future cash ows and discount rates. As a consequence, a statistic with a greater price association or price
response may be no more informative about future cash ows than a statistic with a lower price association
or price response.19
As a nal example, consider common approaches to infer a rms growth opportunities from market
prices: the market-to-book ratio or Tobins q.20 When price equals fundamental value, a higher market-to-
book ratio implies higher perceived growth prospects. Whenever positive BPA is present, however, the e¤ect
of book value on market values can be higher simply because investors believe they will be higher. Similarly,
when the price path exhibits negative BPA, multiples decrease even when growth prospects remain constant.
This implies that the inferred growth prospects could be systematically biased.
While the above examples illustrate that BPA could cause conceptual constructs inferred from market
prices to be misleading, this is not to say that BPA guarantees they will be signicantly misleading. Whether
they are signicantly misleading depends upon the prevalence and magnitude of BPA episodes that the
researcher has not taken into account. Given that we have not identied how a researcher can identify
and account for a BPA episode, at best we can merely suggest that researchers exercise caution with their
interpretations of conceptual constructs inferred from market prices and, to the extent possible, that they
validate ndings with alternative measures of those constructs.
6.2. Predictive Empirical Implications
In addition to the above cautionary implications, our model can also guide empirical researchers towards
more specic empirical tests. A main condition to conduct these tests is that the researcher identies when
certain equilibria are more likely to be played. For example, one might hypothesize that investors will play
a BPA equilibrium when rm management and the media focus their attention on a single performance
statistic such as earnings (or sales or clicks). Given that hypothesis, our model provides predictions as to
18 In their review of the earnings quality literature, Dechow et al. (2010) discusss the lengthy literature that employs market
responses to measure information content.
19 For example, our model provides an alternative explanation for the observed increase in market responses to earnings over
time, which has been documented in Landsman and Maydew (2002) as well as Francis et al. (2002). While Landsman and
Maydew (2002) suggests that changes in rm characteristics have contributed to the increased market response, the increase
in association over time is signicant even controlling for those characteristics. Francis et al. (2002) suggest that the amount
of information disclosed concurrently with earnings has increased, leading to the nding that market response around the time
of an earnings announcement has increased. In addition to the explanations o¤ered by Landsman and Maydew (2002) and
Francis et al. (2002), our model suggests the increased market response to earnings could be an equilibrium outcome even if
rm characteristics and the amount of information disclosed are held constant.
20 For example, see Collins and Kothari (1989) and Penman (1996).
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the pricing behavior that would be observed during periods when management and the media emphasize a
particular statistic in their disclosures.
6.2.1. Price Association and Price Variation
In periods with positive BPA, t > 0, the association between earnings and price, and the resulting price
variation, can be signicantly larger than the association and variation implied by a fundamental valuation.
Furthermore, t can vary over time even though the relation between earnings and future cash ows is stable.
In addition to providing these straightforward observations, however, our formal model also provides some
additional observations regarding price associations and price variation.
Corollary 1. Assume the equilibrium price path is characterized by the pricing function P ("t; ;), where
 > 0, over the time span  to  + k. The coe¢ cient on earnings and the variance in price is increasing
each period over the time span  to  + k. Furthermore, the growth in the coe¢ cient on earnings and the
variation in prices along that path is increasing in the risk free interest rate, r, and decreasing in the degree
of persistence in abnormal earnings, .
Given that an empiricist identies a time span when positive BPA is expected to occur, Corollary 1 o¤ers a
number of empirically oriented implications that should arise over that time span. First, the price association
with earnings and the variance of prices should be increasing. In addition, the growth in the coe¢ cient and
the variance of earnings should be increasing in the risk free rate and decreasing in the persistence of earnings.
We should point out that a perfectly clean analogue to Corollary 1 does not arise for episodes of negative
BPA,  < 0. In particular, during such an episode, the coe¢ cient on earnings will decrease each period and
eventually become, perhaps implausibly, negative. While the variance in price will also decrease initially, it
begins to increase as soon as the coe¢ cient on earnings becomes negative. That is, in contrast to the case of
positive BPA described in Corollary 1, the variance of price is U-shaped as opposed to monotonic over time.
6.2.2. Expected Prices
While an important characteristic of positive (negative) BPA is a greater (smaller) association between
prices and earnings as well as greater (lesser and then, ultimately, greater) price volatility, BPA also results
in price levels that di¤er from the steady-state price level. More interestingly, the expected price levels
systematically di¤er if investors are strictly risk averse.
Corollary 2. Assume investors are risk averse and the equilibrium price path is characterized by the pricing
function P ("t; ;), where  > 0, over the time span  to  + k. The time- expectation of price for time-
t 2 ( ; +k] exceeds the steady-state expected price. For  < 0 and jtj < , the price is below the steady-state
price in expectation; for  < 0 and jtj > , the price exceeds the steady-state price in expectation.
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The rst part of Corollary 2 holds because, when prices are more volatile, risk averse investors are compen-
sated with greater expected payo¤s, which is achieved in equilibrium by greater expected returns and an
associated upward drift in prices. The upward drift in prices, in turn, implies higher expected price levels.
The increased price volatility occurs whenever jtj > . This implies that expected price levels will be
higher for su¢ ciently negative BPA (or a su¢ ciently long  < 0 price path). However, when  < 0 leads to
a su¢ ciently small decrease in t, such that jtj < , then price volatility is reduced, and expected price
levels are below those of the steady-state path.
From an empirical perspective, Corollary 2 also implies that, in a time span in which BPA is predicted to
occur, price-to-earnings ratios should be higher despite the fact that economic fundamentals are unchanged.
Note, that while the increased expected prices on a BPA equilibrium path seem desirable, they come at the
cost of high expected returns. That is, the cost of capital, as dened by expected returns, is higher and
increasing on a BPA path. If this cost of capital is an important determinant in rmsinvestment choices, it
could lead to less investment. If, on the other hand, price levels are the more important determinant, then
more investment could result.
6.2.3. Reversion to a Focal Steady-State Path
Among the piecewise-linear pricing paths, the steady-state price path (t =  and t = ) might be
viewed as focal due to its inherent simplicity and the stability of the pricing parameters over time. Even
if the steady-state pricing path is focal, however, temporary periods of BPA, or BPA bubbles, might arise.
We take as given the possibility of BPA bubbles and then assess the types of earnings realizations that must
occur for the pricing function to revert back to the steady-state pricing function. To study the properties
of an equilibrium in which BPA pricing bubbles arise and the steady-state path is focal,we consider an
equilibrium in which the price path begins on the steady state, characterized by pricing function P ("t; 0; 0),
then enters a period with positive BPA of degree  > 0 at time  , and reverts back to the steady state at
time  + m. In order to switch, the two paths have to meet twice, at t =  and at t =  + m. Therefore
the price path is dened by P ("t; ;), where P (" ; ;) = P (" ; 0; 0), and reverts back to P ("t; 0; 0) at
the rst date  + m in which P ("+m; 0; 0) = P ("+m; ;). Corollary 3 shows that cumulative earnings
between times  and  +m has to be negative such that a path with positive BPA and the steady-state price
path can converge again.
Corollary 3. Assume investors are strictly risk averse and, at time t =  , the price path changes from
steady state to one that exhibits positive BPA, i.e.,  > 0. For the equilibrium price to converge back to
the steady-state price at time t =  + m, where m > 0, earnings at t =  + m must equal "+m where
"+m < 
m" . Furthermore, "+m is decreasing in m and approaches negative innity as m approaches
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innity.
The rst statement in Corollary 3 implies that earnings news must be bad for the BPA and steady-state
paths to meet. Hence, once investors exhibit BPA, a return to steady-state fundamental pricing must be
associated with bad news. Empirically, this predicts that a large decrease in earnings response coe¢ cients
should follow surprising negative earnings. The second statement in the corollary implies that, as the period
of BPA increases in duration, the worse the news needs to be to converge back to a steady state. Given
that extreme realizations are less likely, this observation suggests that the likelihoodof convergence back
to steady-state prices decreases as the duration of BPA increases. Of course, given our assumption that
earnings are distributed continuously whereas trading occurs in discrete intervals, the probability of precise
convergence is always 0. If earnings were discrete or trading were continuous, however, the probability of
precise convergence would not be 0, and we would expect the insight in Corollary 3 to hold. Finally, Corollary
3 suggests that an empiricist who identies a time span when BPA is expected to occur should expect to see
those periods come to an end if and only if earnings news is bad.
Corollary 3 only applies to episodes of positive BPA,  > 0. A simple analogue to Corollary 3 does not
arise for episodes of negative BPA because, when  < 0, the direction of the earnings surprise necessary for
the BPA price and steady-state price to converge changes over time. As described above,  < 0 leads to
  < t <  for the initial periods of a negative BPA episode, which implies that the expected future price is
lower than in the steady state because prices are less volatile (i.e., BPA drift is negative during these periods).
During these periods, then, the earnings surprise has to be negative for the paths to converge. Finally, the
negative BPA episode becomes so long that t <  , and the BPA price exceeds the steady-state price in
expectation because prices are more volatile (i.e., BPA drift is positive during these periods). In this range,
only a positive earnings surprise will lead to convergence (i.e., a positive earnings surprise coupled with the
counterintuitive negative price response along the BPA path causes the two paths to converge).
7. Conclusion
Using an overlapping-generations modeling framework, we consider the implications that arise from in-
vestors beliefs that investors in subsequent periods will place greater or lesser emphasis on earnings in-
formation relative to fundamental valuation. We describe this phenomenon as one where current investors
exhibit beliefs-driven price association(BPA). Our analysis demonstrates that BPA can be a self-fullling
phenomenon and, as a consequence, can arise as an equilibrium behavior in a setting in which all investors
have rational expectations. In addition, we show that there are equilibrium pricing paths exhibiting episodes
of BPA followed by periods in which prices are consistent with a fundamental valuation framework.
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While our modeling framework does not predict which price path is taken in equilibrium, it does yield a
number of empirical insights. For example, during periods of positive BPA, the model predicts that prices
will have a higher association with the value-relevant statistic, will exhibit greater volatility, and will appear
to be high relative to a fundamental valuation framework. Furthermore, our model suggests that, during
periods of BPA, common approaches that rely upon market prices to infer costs of capital, the information
content of a value relevant statistic, or growth opportunities will be systemically biased. Finally, the fact
that BPA can be time varying suggests that price volatility and expected returns can be time varying even
if underlying fundamentals are stable.
As an extension, we consider a setting with two risky assets in order to assess how BPA in the market for
one asset can spill over to a¤ect the pricing of another asset. We show that increasing BPA with respect to
one asset need not have any impact on the price volatility of the other asset, irrespective of the correlation
between the assetsfundamental earnings ows. Increasing BPA with respect to one asset, however, does
inuence the price level and expected price change of the other asset if the former asset is large in magnitude
and the correlation between the assetsfundamental ows is not zero.
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Table of Notation
"t earnings/cash-ows at time-t
t earnings/cash-ow innovation at time-t
 persistence of earnings
v variance of earnings innovation
r risk free return
 coe¢ cient of constant absolute risk aversion
t intercept term in price at time-t
 rst-moment drift parameter
t price association at time-t
 degree of BPA
q demand in the assets shares
 shares of asset 1 per capita
c covariance between 1t and 2t
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Appendix A Proofs
Lemma 1. The proof follows directly from the fact that the coe¢ cient specications satisfy the equilibrium
conditions (5) and (6) for any t.
Proposition 1. To prove Proposition 1, it is useful to rst adopt some notation for characterizing the linear
equilibria from Lemma 1. Specically, let ht  f"0; "1;:::"t 1g denote the history of earnings realizations up
to but not including time ts realization. A piecewise-linear equilibrium is dened as follows:
Denition 1. A piecewise-linear equilibrium is characterized by a pricing function of the form
P (ht; "t) = P
S
t ("t)+t (ht)+t (ht) "t that satises the following condition for any period t real-
ization of ht+1: There exist values  (ht+1) and  (ht+1) such that P (ht; "t) = P ("t;  (ht+1) ;  (ht+1))
given ht+1 and P (ht+1; "t+1) = P ("t+1;  (ht+1) ;  (ht+1)) for all "t+1.
Conjecture an equilibrium pricing function such that, for all t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g, the price is P ("t; 1;1) =
1t + 1t"t, where 1t =  +
 
1+r

t
1, and 1t =  + (1 + r)
t
1 + v1 (2Jt +Kt1) and for all t 2
f ;  + 1;  + 2; :::g, the price is P ("t; 2;2) = 2t + 2t"t where 1t =  +
 
1+r

t
2, 2  0, 2 6= 1,
2t = +(1 + r)
t
2 +v2 (2Jt +Kt2), and 2 is set so that P ("t; 1;1) = 1 +1" = 2 +2" =
P ("t; 2;2) or 2 = 1 + 1

(1 2)" + v(1+r)

2J (1   2) +K (21   22)

. Hence, all investors believe
that at time  the pricing function changes so that it is characterized by a di¤erent degree of BPA, 2
as opposed to 1, and that the constant term adjusts at time  so that the time  price is identical to
the price that would be realized under the initial pricing function P ("t; 1;1). In order for this path to
constitute an equilibrium, markets have to clear at any point in time. For t <    1, the market clears
at price P ("t; 1;1) following Lemma 1. At t =    1, young investor demands as a function of price
are the same as they would be if the pricing function for  continued to be characterized by P ("t; 1;1)
because P ("t; 1;1) = P ("t; 2;2) for any realization " . Hence the market clears a time    1 at price
P ("t; 1;1). Finally, for all t   , the market clears at P ("t; 2;2) following Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. The variance in price at time t equals 2t v =

 +
 
1+r

t

2
v, so the growth in variation
between  and  + k equals
 +
 
1+r

+k

2
    +   1+r  2 v =    1+r k   1   1+r  2 +   1+r     1+r k + 1 v > 0.
The inequality holds since  2 (0; 1) and r > 0. The growth in variation between  and +k is increasing in r
and decreasing in  since
@


1+r 

( 1+r )
k 1

@ =   1 1+r(1+r )2



1    1+r k+ k   1 (r + 1)k 1 (1 + r   ) <
0 and
@


1+r 

( 1+r )
k 1

@r =
1
(1+r )2



1    1+r k+ k   1 (r + 1)k 1 (1 + r   ) > 0.
Corollary 2. At time  , it must be the case that the price in the steady state equals the price on path
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P ("t; ;):
+ (1 + r)

(  ) + v (2J +K) +

 +

1 + r




" = + " , (A.1)
which implies
(1 + r)

(  ) + v (2J +K) +

1 + r


" = 0. (A.2)
At time- , the expected time-( +m) price along path P ("t; ;), where m 2 (0; k), less the steady-state
price is
+ (1 + r)
+m
(  ) + v (2J+m +K+m)
+
 
 +

1 + r

+m

!
m"   (+ m" ) , (A.3)
or
(1 + r)
+m
(  ) + v (2J+m +K+m) +

1 + r

+m
m" . (A.4)
Relying on eqn. (A.2), eqn. (A.4) can be written as:
2v (J+m   (1 + r)m J )  v2 (K+m   (1 + r)mK ) , (A.5)
or
2v
(1 + r)
+m+1
(1   )
+m (1 + r   ) (1  )

1  +m
1     
m

+v2
(1 + r)
+m+1
1 + r   2
(1 + r)
   2()
2(+m)
 
(1 + r)
+m   2(+m)
(1 + r)
   2()   
2m
!
, (A.6)
which is strictly positive if  > 0 because  2 (0; 1) implies 1 +m1    m > 0 and
(1+r)+m 2(+m)
(1+r) 2()   
2m > 0.
Corollary 3. Assume at time t =  investors deviate from the steady-state path and begin to exhibit BPA.
Similar to eqn. (A.1), the following equation has to hold for the two price paths to meet at time t:
(1 + r)
t
(  ) + v (2Jt +Kt) +

1 + r

t
"t = 0. (A.7)
Additionally, in order for the steady-state price path to meet the one where investors exhibit BPA at date
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t+m, it must be the case that
(1 + r)
t+m
(  ) + v (2Jt+m +Kt+m) +

1 + r

t+m
"t+m = 0, or
(1 + r)
t
(  ) + v
(1 + r)
m (2Jt+m +Kt+m) +

1 + r

t

"t+m
m
= 0. (A.8)
Using eqn. (A.7) and the fact that "t+m =
Pm
i=1 
m it+i + 
m"t, we can re-express (A.8) as

1 + r

tXm
i=1
 it+i =  v

2Jt+m +Kt+m
(1 + r)
m   (2Jt +Kt)

. (A.9)
The proof to Corollary 2 shows that the right hand (A.9) is negative, which completes the proof.
Observation 2. In any linear equilibrium of the form in (16), the demand of shares in asset i by a new
investor in period t is
qit =
i"it + it+1 + it+1i"it   c
 
1 + it+1
  
1 + jt+1

qjt   (1 + r)Pit
vi
 
1 + it+1
2 , (A.10)
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. Market clearing yields the pricing conditions in 1719. The proof of the
observation follows directly from inspection of eqn. (20).
Appendix B Alternative Model
Consider an alternative overlapping generations model where earnings follow a process of the form
et = reBVt 1 + "t. (B.1)
Here, et is period t earnings, BVt 1 is the book value at the beginning of period t (end of t   1), re is the
normal return on equity, and "t is the abnormal earnings in period t. The abnormal earnings follows the
same process as before,
"t = "t 1 + t. (B.2)
However, di¤erent from the model above, only a proportion ! of earnings is paid out as a dividend. We
assume that clean surplus accounting holds such that the ending book value equals beginning book value
plus earnings less dividends:
BVt = BVt 1 + et   !et = BVt 1 + (1  !)(reBVt 1 + "t). (B.3)
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In order for the present value of future dividends to be nite, reinvested earnings cannot yield too high of
an expected return. The necessary condition for this to be the case, which we assume holds throughout, is
that r > re(1  !). Investors have the same negative exponential utility functions as in the main text. Just
as in the main text, we rst establish the steady-state equilibrium and then move to the BPA equilibrium.
Steady state: The steady-state price is given by
Pt = + BVt + "t, (B.4)
where
 =   v!
2r (1 + r)
2
(1 + r   )2 (r   re (1  !))2
, (B.5)
 =
!re
r   re (1  !) , and (B.6)
 =
!r
(1 + r   ) (r   re (1  !)) . (B.7)
Therefore,  is increasing in the equity rate of return, re, because a greater average return on invested capital
implies greater future cash ows for investors. It is decreasing in the dividend payout ratio ! as long as the
average return on invested capital exceeds the risk free rate, re > r, because the invested capital yields cash
ows incremental to the opportunity cost of the investment. Finally, it is decreasing in the risk free rate, r,
which e¤ectively discounts the future cash ows to investors. The coe¢ cient on abnormal earnings is greater
if the persistence parameter, , is greater, because a more persistent abnormal earnings has more signicant
implications for future cash ows. Given that abnormal earnings are reinvested to earn re, the coe¢ cient
on abnormal earnings is increasing in re and is decreasing in ! if re > r for the same reasons the coe¢ cient
on ending book value changes in re and !. Finally, the constant term,  < 0, captures the price haircut
for risk, and it is intuitively larger in magnitude (i.e., more negative) when abnormal earnings innovations
have more impact on price. Hence it is greater in magnitude if the abnormal earnings innovation is more
persistent (i.e.,  is greater), if the reinvested abnormal earnings earn a greater return (i.e., re is greater),
if the discount rate is lower (i.e., r is lower), and, assuming re > r, if the dividend payout is lower (i.e., re
is lower). Obviously, it is also increasing in magnitude if the variance of the innovation, v, is larger or the
degree of risk aversion, , is larger.
BPA: For any  > 0 and initial value for the constant term in the pricing function , there exists an
equilibrium pricing function
Pt = t + tBVt + t"t, (B.8)
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where
t =  =
!re
r   re (1  !) , (B.9)
t =  +

1 + r

t
, (B.10)
t = + (1 + r)
t
(  ) + v (Jt +Kt) . (B.11)
Again,  = !rer re(1 !) ,  =
!r
(1+r )(r re(1 !)) , and  =  
v!2r(1+r)2
(1+r )2(r re(1 !))2 are the steady-state coe¢ -
cients and intercept, and Jt = 2
(1+r)t(1 t)
(1 )t

r!(1+r)
(1+r )(r re(1 !))

and Kt =
(1+r)t+1((1+r)t 2t)
(1+r 2)2t .
Appendix C Renements
The set of piecewise-linear equilibria captures a plethora of equilibria, some of which might be deemed to
have implausible properties such as excessive price responses to earnings or price blowing up to innity
as time passes. In an e¤ort to focus attention on plausible equilibrium paths, we consider a few equilibrium
renements. We initially consider a renement that is consistent in spirit with the imposition of a transver-
sality condition, which is an exogenous requirement that any equilibrium must satisfy as time passes. While
arguably ad hoc, transversality conditions are justied by a notion that an economy should gravitate towards
a pricing path that is conceptually appealing. We term this renement limiting condition. The next two
renements that we consider are tied to thought experiments regarding individual investor behavior. We
term the rst of these renements strategic dominance as it is based on the thought experiment of how
individuals might react to the strategic uncertainty induced by the possibility of multiple equilibrium price
paths. In the second of the two, local stability, we focus on a local stability criterion, which relies on a
thought experiment for how individuals would respond to small perturbations from equilibrium behaviors.
1 Limiting Condition
Within the context of our model, the steady-state price path is a sensible anchor for a transversality-
like condition because the steady-state pricing function resembles a conceptually appealing fundamental
valuation in which price equals the discounted expectation of future cash ows with an adjustment for risk.
Accordingly, we consider a renement characterized by a limiting condition linked to deviations from the
steady-state price, which is characterized by a date  > 0 and a probability  2 (0; 1].
Denition 2. An piecewise-linear equilibrium price path P (ht; "t) satises a f ; g limiting condition if,
as of date t = 0, E [P (h+1; "+1)    "+1jh+1] = 0 with probability .
Intuitively, a f ; g renement requires that there be a su¢ ciently high probability at the start of the market
that investors in some future period will expect the deviation from the steady-state price to be 0.
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Obviously, the steady-state price path satises any f ; g renement. Furthermore, any f ; g renement
is su¢ ciently stringent that any path characterized by a f;g pricing function fails to satisfy the condition.
Eliminating these paths from consideration is arguably appealing because the magnitude of the price response
to earnings at date t, jtj, and the expected price at date t, E [P ("t; 1;1) j"0], both approach innity as
t approaches innity, which seems a priori implausible. The critical question remaining is whether a f ; g
convergence renement rules out all piecewise-linear pricing paths besides the steady-state path. In the
proof to Observation 3, we demonstrate through example that, as long as  < 1, there exist piecewise-linear
equilibria in which price exhibits varying degrees of BPA or negative BPA, and that the only piecewise-
linear equilibrium satisfying a f ;  = 1g renement is the steady-state equilibrium. The last observation is
attributable to the fact that the support for the innovation to earnings is unbounded.
Observation 3. Given any f ; g renement where  < 1, (1) The steady-state equilibrium satises the
f ; g renement. (2) No constant BPA equilibrium in which  6= 0 and/or  6=  satises the f ; g
renement. (3) There exist piecewise-linear equilibria exhibiting time-varying degrees of BPA or negative
BPA that satisfy the f ; g renement. (4) Given any f ;  = 1g renement, the only piecewise-linear
equilibrium that satises the renement is the steady-state equilibrium.
Proof (1) Obviously, E [+ "+1     "+1jh+1] = 0 with probability 1. (2) Since (1 + r)t (  ) and
v (2Jt +Kt) are monotone in t and do not converge, it is the case that E [P (h ; " )    " jh ] 6= 0
for any  6= 0 and either  6= 0 or  6= 0. (3) Assume that the price path P (h ; " ) has exhibited a steady
degree of BPA since t = , , and had an intercept term of  at t = . At any time t = , where  
   , the price path can switch the degree of BPA to  and intercept term , provided that P (h; ") =
P (";("); ). This path can be chosen such that  = E [P ("+1;; )    "+1j fh; "g] = 0,
which implies that, in expectation, the price path can switch to the steady-state price path at t = + 1. This
further implies that E [P ("+1; ;  )    "+1j fh ; "g] = 0. The di¤erence  is given by
 = A +B + C
2
, (C.1)
where
A = (1 + r)
 
(1 + r)
 
(   ) + v (2J; +K;) +

1 + r

 
"
!
, (C.2)
B = 2v
(1 + r)
2
 (1 + r   ) , and (C.3)
C = v

1 + r

2
, (C.4)
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as well as
J; =
1   
1  

1 + r

 +1

1 + r    and (C.5)
K; =
(1 + r)
    2( )
1 + r   2
(1 + r)
 +1
2( )
. (C.6)
From eqn. (C.1), it is obvious that, due to the risk-drift-premium, v (2J;+1 +K;+1), the expected
di¤erence to the steady-state is quadratic in . The coe¢ cient of the quadratic term, C, is nonnegative
( v
 
1+r

2  0) such that the pricing function is U-shaped in the price association. Note that only A
depends on the time of the switch. Eqn. (C.1) further implies that, for any B2   4AC  0, there exist two
solutions for  such that the expected di¤erence to the steady state in t = + 1 equals zero. However, the
condition B2   4AC  0 depends on the earnings realization in t = , ". Specically, assuming  > 0, a
su¢ ciently positive earnings realization " increases E [P ("+1;; )] above E [P ("+1;;  = 0)] for any
level of . Therefore, for any price path, there exists a probability that at t =  the economy can switch to
a path such that E [P ("+1;; )] = E [P ("+1;;  = 0)]. Condition B2   4AC  0 can be rewritten as
  D, where
D  
 

 
v (1 + r)
 +1
(1 + r   )2   (   )
!
 


1 + r
 
v (2J; +K;)  " 1. (C.7)
Our renement therefore requires that
DZ
 1
f
 


d   or F (D)  , (C.8)
where F
 


denotes the cumulative density function of the earnings surprise. (4) As the distribution for
 is unbounded, there is always a nonzero probability that  > D.
2 -strategic Dominance
We term the next renement that we investigate -strategic dominance,which is consistent with a vari-
ety of renements that have been used in the literature. Our notion of strategic dominance captures the
following thought experiment for how an investor would behave when faced with strategic uncertainty (i.e.,
uncertainty over which equilibrium path is being played). Assume a generation  investor observes fh ; "g
and price P^ (h ; " ) = P (h ; " ), and that the investor faces strategic uncertainty regarding which pricing
path, P^ (ht; "t) or P (ht; "t), will be played going forward. The investors decision-making in this context is
characterized by a two-stage process. In the rst stage, the investor commits to one of the two equilibrium
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price paths. In the second stage, the investor chooses an optimal quantity given the beliefs committed to
in the rst stage. In other words, the investor will play a strategy consistent with either P^ (ht; "t) or with
P (ht; "t). The second stage is a standard approach for characterizing behavior and merely requires that
the investor maximize expected utility given beliefs about the equilibrium pricing path. The rst stage is,
however, is nonstandard and is a means for characterizing the beliefs an investor will adopt. We assume that
the investor experiences regret if he plays the wrong equilibrium. Specically, we assume that the investor
weights his expected utility from playing the correct equilibrium with  and his expected utility from playing
the wrong equilibrium with 1   . Denote E[ ~Utjq (ht; "t) ; P (ht; "t)] as a generation-t investors expected
utility given that he chooses quantity q (ht; "t); the price path is given by P (ht; "t), where q (h ; " ) maxi-
mizes a generation  investors expected utility given equilibrium price path P (ht; "t) and earnings history
fh ; "g. Therefore the expected utility from choosing q^ (h ; " ) or q (h ; " ) is given by
E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " )] = E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " ) ; P^ (ht; "t)] + (1  )E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " ) ; P (ht; "t)] (C.9)
and
E[ ~U jq (h ; " )] = E[ ~U jq (h ; " ) ; P (ht; "t)] + (1  )E[ ~U jq (h ; " ) ; P^ (ht; "t)]. (C.10)
Given fh ; "g and P^ (h ; " ) = P (h ; " ), price path P^ (h ; " ) dominates P (h ; " ) under -strategic
dominance when the weighted expected utility from q^ (h ; " ) is larger that the one from q (h ; " ), i.e.,
whenever
E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " )]  E[ ~U jq (h ; " )]. (C.11)
Depending upon the choice of , the -strategic dominance renement criteria can collapse to other seemingly
reasonable renement criteria. For example, if  = 1; any equilibrium price path the satises the renement
is one that maximizes each generations ex ante expected utility, which is consistent with Harsanyi and
Seltens (1988) notion of payo¤ dominance. At the other extreme, if  = 0, a generation-t investor would
commit to the equilibrium price path that minimizes his loss from conjecturing the wrong equilibrium.
This calibration captures the notion of risk dominance in Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
While the single period example is useful for conveying the intuition underlying -strategic dominance,
it must be extended to accommodate our multi-period model.
Denition 3. A piecewise-linear price path P^ (ht; "t) is a -strategic dominant price path if, for any
period  and associated fh ; "tg, there does not exist another piecewise-linear price path P (ht; "t) such that
P (h ; " ) = P^ (h ; " ) and E[ ~U jq (h ; " )] > E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " )].
Observation 3 identies properties of any -strategic dominant equilibrium pricing path.
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Observation 4. If  > 12 , there does not exist a -strategic dominant pricing path P (ht; "t) such that, for
any ht,  (ht) is nite. If  < 12 , any -strategic dominant pricing path has the property that, for any date
t, f (ht) ;  (ht)g eliminates all uncertainty at date t   1. If  = 12 , any piecewise-linear pricing path is
-strategic dominant.
Proof. Since the investor observes the current price, Pt, it has to be the case that P^ (ht; "t) = P (ht; "t).
Following the proof of Proposition 1, without loss of generality, we can rewrite P^ (ht; "t) and P (ht; "t) as
P (1;1) and P (2;2), respectively, and assume that both P (1;1) and P (2;2) are the result of a
shift; in other words, Jt = Kt = 0.
Denote qi the investors optimal quantity for price path P (i;i), choosing qi yields an expected utility
of
1

(1   exp[ Xi;i]  (1  ) exp[ Xi;j ]) ,
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. Xi;j denotes the investors certainty equivalent when choosing qi after observing
Pt while Pt+1 is determined by the path P (j ;j). This implies that
Xi;j = qi
 
t+1;j +
 
1 + t+1;j

"t

+ (1 + r) (w   qiPt)  q2i
v
2
 
1 + t+1;j
2
. (C.12)
The requirement that the investor rst observes Pt implies that P^ (ht; "t) = P (ht; "t) and that the investors
optimal demand qi is the equilibrium demand, qi = 1, irrespective of the path determining Pt. This simplies
(C.12) to
Xi;j =
1
2
v
 
1 + t+1;j
2
+ (1 + r)w. (C.13)
An investor will commit to q1 whenever
(1  2) exp[ 
2v
2
 
1 + t+1;1
2
]  (1  2) exp[ 
2v
2
 
1 + t+1;2
2
]. (C.14)
This implies that when  < 12 the investor will choose the lowest absolute ( 1 + t+1 = 0) and when  >
1
2
the investor would prefer  (ht)!1. For  = 12 , both paths yield the same expected utility.
Observation 4 implies that the equilibrium selection criterion requires an innite earnings response (either
positive or negative) when  > 12 . The reason investors prefer the innite response is because they bear the
most risk in such an equilibrium. At rst pass, this observation might seem counterintuitive because investors
are risk averse. Such knee-jerk intuition is misplaced, however, because the market clearing condition implies
that investors must be compensated for taking on the risk associated with the last marginal share they
acquire. Because the degree of compensation for risk required to get investors to take a marginally higher
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stake is increasing in the quantity of shares held, investors earn rents for taking on risk associated with all of
the shares held except for the last marginal share. These rents reect the investorsconsumer surplus in our
model. Due to the fact that market prices adjust to clear the market and those price adjustments more than
compensate investors for the total risk assumed, investors earn more rents when they assume more risk in
equilibrium. As a consequence, investors always prefer an equilibrium with greater price variability, which
implies they prefer equilibria exhibiting the greatest degree of BPA.
In contrast to the case when  > 12 , when  <
1
2 investors are highly averse to committing to the wrong
equilibrium. This aversion dominates the rents from taking on risk, and investors want to minimize price
variability. As a consequence, the degree of BPA or negative BPA is set in each period to o¤set all risk by
ensuring that the dividend payment exactly o¤sets the exit price. In other words, the required rate of return
is guaranteedeach period via a xed rst moment price drift.
As an alternative renement related to our notion of -strategic dominance, one might instead consider
our thought experiment where a generation  investor commits to a set of beliefs, P^ (h ; " ) or P (h ; " ), in a
rst stage with the caveat that the investor believes that P^ (ht; "t) and P (ht; "t) are played with probability
 2 [0; 1] and 1   , respectively. A renement structured around this thought experiment is as follows.
Consider an equilibrium price path P^ (ht; "t). P^ (ht; "t) is a -strategic dominant equilibrium if, for any
fh ; "g and any other equilibrium price path, P (ht; "t) such that P (h ; " ) = P^ (h ; " ):
E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " ) ; P^ (ht; "t)] + (1  )E[ ~U jq^ (h ; " ) ; P (ht; "t)]
 E[ ~U jq (h ; " ) ; P^ (ht; "t)] + (1  )E[ ~U jq (h ; " ) ; P (ht; "t)]. (C.15)
This alternative renement does not rule out any of our piecewise-linear equilibria.
3 Local Stability
In models involving perfect competition, an equilibrium is locally stable if small perturbations from the equi-
librium naturally give rise to forces in the marketplace that move the system back towards the equilibrium.
Within the context of our model, we consider the e¤ect of small perturbations in demand for all investors at
time t and assess whether their demands would naturally shift back in response to the change in the equi-
librium price induced by the perturbed demand. If investorsdemand shifts in the opposite direction of the
perturbed demand, the equilibrium is deemed to be stable in the sense that the investor demand response
keeps the price from drifting away from the equilibrium price. If, on the other hand, the investors shift
demand in the same direction as the perturbed demand, the equilibrium is unstable because their response
causes the price to move further from the equilibrium price. Because investor demands at any time t are not
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directly inuenced by the behavior of other investors and are decreasing in price at time t, it is relatively
easy to establish that any piecewise-linear equilibrium is locally stable.
Assume that every investorsdemand at time t is perturbed away from their optimal demand by  so
their demand is given by
qpt =
t+1 +
 
1 + t+1

"t   (1 + r)Pt
v
 
1 + t+1
2 + , (C.16)
where the ht+1 corresponding to t+1 and t+1 is suppressed. Given these perturbed demands, the market
clearing price would rise to
Ppt =
t+1 +
 
1 + t+1

"t   (1  ) v
 
1 + t+1
2
(1 + r)
, (C.17)
which exceeds the equilibrium price by
v(1+t+1)
2
(1+r) . At the perturbed equilibrium price, the traders optimal
demand is
qt =
t+1 +
 
1 + t+1

"t   (1 + r)Ppt
v
 
1 + t+1
2 = 1  . (C.18)
Hence, given the change in price induced by the perturbation in their demands, the investors naturally alter
their demands in the opposite direction of the perturbation. Accordingly, we have our nal observation.
Observation 5. All piecewise-linear equilibria are locally stable.
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